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Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom
Stanley P. Williams Jr.

ABSTRACT
Criminal justice and bias cannot continue to coexist. Bias that infiltrates our
criminal justice system may threaten the legitimacy of our courts. Bias that penetrates
the criminal court unmistakably threatens innocent lives. This Paper invents a novel
procedural solution, within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment, that confronts a longfelt but unsolved need to eradicate bias in the criminal courtroom. It aims to
revolutionize how criminal proceedings are conducted through a model that embodies
our Founding Fathers' pursuit of impartiality while pitting longstanding dogma
against scientific data. This Paper discusses how bias affects both judges and jurors,
the drawbacks of current methods or proposals designed to address bias, and finally,
draws a blueprint for a practical and immediate solution: The Double-Blind System.
INTRODUCTION
Two hundred and thirty years ago, our Founders formed the basis for our
Constitution, which sought to establish justice and secure the blessings of liberty for
all Americans.1 No context evokes the palpable sense of justice and liberty in one
setting like a courtroom that will decide whether one may be sentenced to
imprisonment or death. The Founders appreciated this power and devoted the Sixth
Amendment solely to criminal prosecutions.2 The Impartial Jury Clause contained in
this Amendment—though not as reknown or contested as clauses found in the First
or Second Amendments—deserves equal recognition.3
Our inability to fulfill this obligation to impartiality is echoed by a juror’s
statement that led to a recent sexual assault conviction: “I think he did it because
he’s Mexican, and Mexican men take whatever they want.” 4 Bias, seemingly like
electricity, is neither created nor destroyed but simply transferred or changed from
one form to another. In AD 54, it manifested itself in Nero’s persecution of
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3
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Deputy District Attorney, Marin County, California. Email: https://cal.berkeley.edu/spw. The author
thanks professors Wendy E. Wagner and Jennifer E. Laurin for their invaluable insight and feedback.
The author also thanks the editors of the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, including
Tristan Fretwell, Samuel Seeds, James Vandeventer, and Michele Wilcox-Petrites for their tireless
work.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
Adam Liptak, Racial Bias Among Jurors at Heart of Supreme Court Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-case-on-juror-racial-bias.html.
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Christians. 5 In 1619, Jamestown, Virginia, planted the seeds of bias in America
through the harvests of cotton and tobacco. 6 In 1933 and 1942, bias concentrated
people into camps in Auschwitz and California respectively.7 After our Towers fell on
9/11, hate crimes against Muslims soared.8 The effects of explicit bias are undeniable,
yet what happens to bias that is concealed or implicit? Ideally the walls of a courtroom
would repel such biases. In reality, our current system enables them to enter the
courtroom virtually unchecked. Our inability to curb these biases produces costs
beyond undermining the legitimacy of convictions. The Supreme Court admits bias
taints the jury selection process itself.9 Bias incurs further costs to taxpayers when
trials must be retried: For instance, the national average cost of adjudicating a
homicide is between $22,000 and $44,000.10 Other costs are not as easily measured,
such as a victim who must relive a trial or the loss of public confidence in our criminal
justice system. But what if those costs could be avoided? What if the unfulfilled
promise from 1789, that “the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury
. . . ,”11 could be delivered regardless of the era?
This Paper addresses that long-felt need by inventing a novel procedural
remedy for bias—proven to be effective—that can be implemented immediately.
Therefore, the ambit of this Paper is limited to the adjudication stage and is confined
to the walls of the courtroom. It addresses biases that affect jurors and judges,
explains how our system currently addresses bias, and describes a method to prevent
current and future biases. This solution is constitutional, practical, and may serve as
one step toward achieving much-needed criminal justice reform.
I.

BIAS

In its colloquial form, bias is a loose, umbrella term. Unspecified claims of bias
may be levelled against others, such as when Donald Trump said, in reference to a
federal district court judge, “He's got bias.”12 Scholars may identify cognitive biases,
5
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See, e.g., Nero, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/ancient-history/nero (last visited Feb. 26,
2017).
See, e.g., Slavery in America, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/slavery (last
visited Feb. 26, 2017).
See, e.g., DAN STONE, CONCENTRATION CAMPS: A SHORT HISTORY (2017).
Eric Lichtblau, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Most Since Post-9/11 Era, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) (holding that the same equal protection principles as
are applied to determine whether there is discrimination in selecting the venire also govern the State’s
use of peremptory challenges to strike individual jurors from the petit jury). See generally Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that exclusion of black jurors violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
Priscillia Hunt, James Anderson & Jessica Saunders, The Price of Justice: New National and StateLevel Estimates of the Judicial and Legal Costs of Crime to Taxpayers, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 231–254
(2016).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Tom Kertscher, Donald Trump’s Racial Comments About Federal Hispanic Judge in Trump University
Case, POLITIFACT (June 8, 2016, 4:29 PM),
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such as availability bias. Accordingly, we must clarify terms used in this Paper at
the outset to reduce confusion:
1) Explicit biases are attitudes or stereotypes that one consciously endorses.13
2) Concealed biases are explicit biases that one hides from others in order to
adjust to society’s mores.14
3) Implicit biases are attitudes or stereotypes that one unwittingly holds,
whether or not one endorses those beliefs.15
A.

Implicit Bias

The concept of implicit bias warrants a prelude because it is a relatively new
concept. Implicit bias is real.16 In fact, an overwhelming majority of scientists and
professors agree it exists beyond a reasonable doubt after producing hundreds of peerreviewed articles and replicated studies. 17 Implicit bias derives from more than a
century-old foundation of cognitive research and fits the contemporary consensus
that a vast amount of cognition “occurs automatically, effortlessly, and outside of
conscious awareness.” 18 Although this cognition is subconscious, it can be tested just
like a doctor might test other subconscious processes, like heart rate or body
temperature. Instead of using a thermometer, however, scientists use the Implicit
Association Test (IAT) for implicit biases.19 The IAT measures how quickly someone
pairs a description with another entity.20 The amount of time it takes to pair a word
with an adjective indicates a positive or negative mental association with the word.21
IAT results, including their construct and predictive validity, are corroborated by
physiological and psychophysiological evidence.22 Notably, implicit biases that arise
out of positive or negative mental associations can be linked with virtually anything,
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http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2016/jun/08/donald-trumps-racial-comments-about-judgetrump-un/.
Jerry Kang, Mark Bennet, Devon Carbado & Pam Casey, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 1124, 1132 (2012).
Id.
Id. at 1129.
Cf. John T. Jost, Laurie Rudman, Irene V. Blair, Dana R. Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser &
Curtis D. Hardin, The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of
Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager
Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORG’L BEHAV. 39, 42 (2009).
See id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 45; see also Flower-Insect IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/user/agg/blindspot/indexflowerinsect.htm (last visited Feb. 19,
2017) (online version of the IAT).
See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 39
(2013).
See id.
Jost et al., supra note 17, at 45.
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including one’s own race or sexual orientation.23 In other words, an Irishman could
hold subconscious negative beliefs about the Irish while extolling Brits.
Consistent mental associations, which develop into implicit or explicit biases,
are established as early as childhood and are cemented over a lifetime.24 According
to developmental psychology research, kindergarteners show the same implicit racial
biases that adults in their culture hold.25 One study revealed that within minutes,
children exposed to fictitious groups with varying socioeconomic statuses discerned
which groups were wealthier, and, in turn, the children revealed a preference for the
wealthier groups. 26 After a few weeks, mere demarcations of gender—such as
teachers labeling children as “boys” or “girls”—led preschoolers and elementary
students to believe boys, but not girls, should become scientists.27 Children also retain
antisocial actions or threatening cues more easily than comparable positive actions.28
For instance, if children learn that refugees pose a danger to their society while also
learning about instances of refugees who contribute to their society, the children will
retain information about the dangerous refugees in greater detail.29 This makes sense
under an evolutionary framework: our survival should depend more upon discerning
the alligator that eats people in greater detail than the fly-eating lizard.
Evolved traits may not translate perfectly into modern culture: constant
alertness, or insomnia, may have saved our ancient ancestors from nightly threats,30
but it sabotages our success on presentations. Similarly, our instincts for fear might
misfire in the modern age and sabotage our trial verdicts.
To better understand the universal trait of fear, let’s consider one of the most
commonly feared things by adults: snakes.31 Most people who share this fear probably
have had no prior direct interaction with a snake to warrant such a strong fear.
23

24
25
26
27

28
29
30

31

SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT PRESIDENTS, CONTROL
MARKETS, WAGE WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES 74 (2010) (“Just as black children tend to have positive
associations with white faces rather than with black faces, gay people can unconsciously harbor the
same associations as straight people.”).
Yarrow Dunham & Mahzarin Banaji, The Development of Implicit Intergroup Cognition, 12 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 248, 252 (2008).
Id. at 250.
See Suzanne R. Horwitz, Kristin Shutts & Kristina R. Olson, Social Class Differences Produce Social
Group Preferences, 17 DEV. SCI. 991, 995 (2014).
Rebecca S. Bigler, The Role of Classification Skill in Moderating Environmental Influences on
Children’s Gender Stereotyping: A Study of the Functional Use of Gender in the Classroom, 66 CHILD
DEV. 1072, 1079–80, 1083 (1995); Lacey J. Hilliard & Lynn S. Liben, Differing Levels of Gender Salience
in Preschool Classrooms: Effects on Children’s Gender Attitudes and Intergroup Bias, 81 CHILD
DEV. 1787, 1794 (2010).
See Nicole C. Baltazar, Kristin Shutts & Katherine D. Kinzler, Children Show Heightened Memory for
Threatening Social Actions, 112 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 102, 107 (2012).
Id.
See Melissa Bateson, Ben Brilot & Daniel Nettle, Anxiety: An Evolutionary Approach, 56 CAN. J.
PSYCHIATRY 707, 711 (2011); see also Louise Atkinson, Trouble Sleeping? The Solution Could Lie in our
Ancestors’ Lifestyle and Taking Rests Like a Caveman, DAILY MAIL, (May 18, 2010, 4:18 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1279204/Trouble-sleeping-The-solution-lie-ancestors-lifestyletaking-rests-like-caveman.html.
Cat Thrasher & Vanessa LoBue, Do Infants Find Snakes Aversive? Infants’ Physiological Responses to
“Fear-Relevant” Stimuli, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 382, 382 (2016).
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Scientists have shown this fear is not innate, but rather, is acquired.32 Fear that is
not innate may be acquired two ways: through direct experience or indirectly through
social observation or communication. 33 So why do so many people fear snakes?
Studies have shown babies and very young children show a predisposition to fear
snakes based merely on a few bad direct experiences or even indirectly via negative
portrayals in media.34 Shifting to our court system, such de minimis exposure might
lead people to fear an African American or a Muslim defendant based solely on one
bad experience or mere news coverage.
The idea that media may indirectly undermine trial impartiality is not a new
concept. In 1966, the Supreme Court stated, “Given the pervasiveness of modern
communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of
the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is
never weighed against the accused.”35 This rationale for a change in venue is well
suited for ephemeral but intense media coverage regarding one accused individual:
for instance, a trial that resembles that of Timothy McVeigh. But the doctrine does
not address pervasive or subtle forms of biases, and yet those can be equally
damaging. Consider biases that arise for a group after similarly intense but
ephemeral coverage of, for example, 9/11; according to Gallup polls, distrust of Arabs
in America has steadily increased after 9/11. 36 The doctrine also fails to address
vestigial attitudes that remain after institutional practices, which are often paired
with deliberate propaganda. Widely distributed pro-slavery propaganda in America
included purported support from the Bible, the Constitution, economists, and
scientific data that claimed Negroes were mentally and physically inferior to the
white race.37
Implicit bias may help explain the staggering differences between, for example,
African Americans and other ethnicities in regard to African-American experience
with the criminal justice system. African Americans are more likely to (1) have their
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 388.
Andreas Olsson, Katherine I. Nearing & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Learning Fears by Observing Others: The
Neural Systems of Social Fear Transmission, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 3, 3 (2007).
Clara Moskowitz, Why We Fear Snakes, LIVE SCIENCE, (Mar. 3, 2008, 7:00 PM),
http://www.livescience.com/2348-fear-snakes.html.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362 (1966).
Costas Panagopoulos, The Polls-Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of
9/11, 70 PUB. OPINION Q. 608, 613, 624 (2006).
Albert Deutsch, The First U.S. Census of the Insane (1840) and Its Use as Pro-Slavery Propaganda,
15 BULL. HIST. MED. 469, 469 (1944); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 14-981) (Indeed in 2015, Justice Scalia surmised, “[T[here are those
who contend that it does not benefit African-Americans to . . . get them into the University of Texas
[Austin] where they do not do well, as opposed to having them go to a less advanced school, a less—a
slower track school where they do well.”). But see Michael McGough, Opinion, No, Scalia’s Comment
About “Less-Advanced” Schools Wasn’t Racist, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015, 2:51 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-scalia-affirmativeaction-supremecourt-20151209story.html (“[I]t’s equally silly to suggest that Scalia was being racist when he clumsily invoked the
mismatch theory.”); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Protesters Disrupt Speech by “Bell Curve” Author at
Vermont College, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/middleburycollege-charles-murray-bell-curve-protest.html (“‘The Bell Curve,’ published in 1994, linked lower socioeconomic status with race and intelligence.”).
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cars searched; (2) be arrested for drug use; (3) be jailed while awaiting trial; (4) be
offered a plea deal that includes prison time; (5) be excluded from juries because of
their race; (6) serve longer sentences than white Americans for the same offense; (7)
be disenfranchised because of a felony conviction; and (8) have their probation
revoked. 38 Generally, one in three African-American males is likely to become
incarcerated at some point, as opposed to Caucasian males, who face a chance of one
in seventeen.39
To demonstrate how pervasive and pernicious implicit bias can be, let’s take a
momentary step away from the adversarial system of criminal law and examine two
fields where all parties’ interests are aligned: healthcare and education. Both fields
demonstrate negative implicit biases that providers may not consciously endorse but
nonetheless act on, producing harmful or even lethal effects.
Preschool teachers—both black and white—scrutinized black children more
closely than white children when asked to spot challenging behavior, though, in
reality, the children never displayed misbehavior because they were child actors.40
The Department of Education found black preschool children are over three times
more likely to be suspended from school than white preschool children. 41 These
findings suggest that implicit biases held by preschool teachers may have tangible
effects on students, despite teachers’ best intentions.
Some doctors and other healthcare providers hold strong implicit biases
towards obese patients.42 This increases the chances of a diagnosis bias, which may
hinder doctors’ ability to reevaluate initial value judgments once they have made
them. When one patient told her doctor she was unable to breathe, the doctor
responded, “That’s the problem with obesity. . . . Have you ever considered going on
a diet?” 43 Subsequent tests revealed that patient’s symptoms stemmed from lifethreatening blood clots in her lungs. 44 As a second patient began to explain her
38

39
40

41
42
43
44

Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to Be Black in the Criminal Justice System, SLATE (Aug. 9,
2015, 12:11 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/08/racial_disparities_in_the_criminal_justi
ce_system_eight_charts_illustrating.html (showing eight charts that show how the justice system is
stacked against black Americans).
Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration/racialdisparities-criminal-justice (last visited Feb 20, 2017).
Walter S. Gilliam, Angela N. Maupin, Chin R. Reyes, Maria Accavitti & Frederick Shic, Do Early
Educators’ Implicit Biases Regarding Sex and Race Relate to Behavior Expectations and
Recommendations of Preschool Expulsions and Suspensions?, YALE CHILD STUD. CTR. 1, 5–7 (2016),
http://www.addressingracialmicroaggressions.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Preschool-Implicit-BiasPolicy-Brief_final_9_26_276766_5379.pdf.
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, A First Look: Key Data Highlights on Equity and
Opportunity Gaps in Our Nation’s Public Schools 1, 3 (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf.
S.M. Phelan, D.J. Burgess, M.W. Yeazel, W.L. Hellerstedt, J.M. Griffin & M. van Ryn, Impact of Weight
Bias and Stigma on Quality of Care and Outcomes for Patients with Obesity, 16 OBESITY REVS. 319,
320–21 (2015).
Gina Kolata, Why Do Obese Patients Get Worse Care? Many Doctors Don’t See Past the Fat, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/health/obese-patients-health-care.html.
See id.
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symptoms, the doctor cut her off, saying, “Let me cut to the chase. You need to lose
weight.” 45 The doctor diagnosed that second patient with “obesity pain;” however,
practitioners later discovered her symptoms resulted from a condition that was not
caused by obesity. 46 Considering that almost 70 percent of American adults are
considered to be overweight or obese,47 implicit bias may cause caregivers to forgo
life-saving measures despite their earnest efforts to heal.
B.

Judicial Bias

Just as doctors take a Hippocratic Oath to do no harm, judges take an oath to
administer justice impartially.48 When asked, 97 percent of judges placed themselves
in an above average category when ranking their ability to “avoid racial prejudice in
decision-making” relative to other judges in their conference. 49 Of course, those
estimates are impossible, since 97 percent of one group, by definition, cannot fit in
the top 50 percent. Justice Kennedy once explained, “Bias is easy to attribute to
others and difficult to discern in oneself.”50
A study including over one-hundred actual judges—both appointed and elected
judges—from three different jurisdictions revealed judges do harbor implicit racial
biases.51 Just like other black adults generally, black judges individually varied in
their preference for white or black individuals.52 White judges demonstrated implicit
white preferences on par with the general population and capital defense attorneys.53
Importantly, these implicit biases held by judges of disparate backgrounds translate
into tangible effects.54 Judges with strong white preferences gave harsher judgments
to black defendants when subliminally primed.55 Alternatively, judges with strong
black preferences were more lenient with black defendants when subliminally
primed.56 Other recent research has shown that judges consistently exhibit negative
in-group biases; when a black judge rules on a black defendant or a white judge rules
on a white defendant, the sentences are 14 percent longer than when ruling on a
defendant of an out-group.57 Despite swearing to administer justice impartially and
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Overweight and Obesity Statistics,
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/health-statistics/Pages/overweight-obesity-statistics.aspx
(last visited Feb 20, 2017).
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012).
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225–26 (2009).
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016).
Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1221.
Id. at 1199-1200, 1221.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1223.
Id. But see id. at 1223 (showing that when race is explicitly manipulated, however, judges show the
capacity to treat defendants comparably).
Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Discovered a New and Surprising Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice
System, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2016),
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undoubtedly attempting to do so in good faith, judges were incapable of acting
impartially when primed with everyday situations.58
Even if the aforementioned biases exist, one may argue a guilty or innocent
verdict depends on the jury, not the judge who just calls balls and strikes. Since the
jury cannot telepathically read the mind of a judge, a judge’s internal biases should
have no practical effect on verdicts. In reality, a judge’s unspoken biases may
influence a jury; study participants who were blind to the result of a trial accurately
predicted jury verdicts based solely on the judge’s verbal and nonverbal cues.59
Many variables of a judge’s background—including, “among others, age, sex,
race, political ideology, and number of years on the bench”—affect judicial behavior
toward trial participants. 60 In turn, the interplay of these variables that affect
behavior may directly affect jury deliberations. 61 Judicial behavior stems from
expectations of cases based on numerous factors; however, one salient factor that
carries no legal significance is the defendant’s socioeconomic status. 62 Yet, judges
tended to infer guilt when defendants came from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.63
Additionally, when judges faced defendants from higher socioeconomic backgrounds,
study participants deemed the judges’ nonverbal behavior to be more professional
and competent.64
C.

Juror Bias

Jury deliberations are black boxes by design so that discussions remain secret,
which promotes juror impartiality, privacy, and candidness. In 2010, a room of jurors
tasked with deciding a sexual assault case turned dark for entirely different reasons.
One juror, a former law enforcement officer, told fellow jurors, “I think he did it
because he’s Mexican, and Mexican men take whatever they want.”65 He continued,
“[N]ine times out of 10” Mexican men were guilty of “being aggressive toward women
and young girls” because of a Mexican “sense of entitlement [and] bravado.”66 After
just two jurors broke their code of silence to report these remarks that occurred during jury
deliberations, the Supreme Court wrestled with the need to preserve the privacy of jury

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/24/researchers-have-discovered-a-surprisingracial-bias-in-the-criminal-justice-system/?utm_term=.51cdaffd9f8; Briggs Depew, Ozkan Eren & Naci
H. Mocan, Judges, Juveniles and In-Group Bias (NBER, Working Paper No. w22003, Feb. 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2736079.
See, Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1225.
See, Peter Blanck, Robert Rosenthal & LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, The Appearance of Justice: Judges’
Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 136–37 (1985).
Id. at 104.
See id. at 136–37.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Liptak, supra note 4.
Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Debates Juror Bias, SLATE (Oct. 12, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_court_dispatches/2016/10/samuel_alito_is_mo
re_worried_about_pc_run_amok_than_a_blatantly_racist_jury.html.
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deliberations while upholding the values of impartial justice.67 The Court ruled in
this case that the secrecy of jury deliberations may be pierced in instances of “overt
racial bias.”68 Yet, the Court provided no standard “for determining when evidence of
racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside and a new trial be
granted.”69
If the former officer held this belief to himself, would that conviction be any
more just? What if the officer was unknowingly biased against Mexicans and voted
for a guilty verdict? What if all twelve jurors said in unison, “He did it because he’s
Mexican” and delivered a guilty verdict? Our current system fails to account for these
respective situations of concealed biases, implicit biases, and explicit biases that go
unreported. Undoubtedly, this former officer swore during voir dire that he would act
impartially. This illuminates that a concealed bias may become an explicit bias based
on who is listening. One could argue this is an isolated incident. On the other hand,
the sign of one roach may indicate many more hiding and multiplying.
Listing a taxonomy of these roaches—or biases—is unnecessary, as biases held
by juries encompass all human bias, which has been discussed ad nauseum in other
books and publications.70 Rather than listing all of these biases, let’s consider some
biases that uniquely arise in a courtroom.
During the course of a trial, jurors noticed the defendant fastidiously drawing
on pieces of paper as he looked toward the jury box.71 As the trial proceeded, one juror
finally approached the judge with some concern.72 The juror told the judge that she
felt uncomfortable because the defendant was drawing pictures of the jurors’ faces.73
In fact, when questioned, other jurors admitted feeling anxious about the drawings
and felt the drawings were inappropriate.74 The judge told the jurors the drawings
were permissible and did not resemble them.75 The judge then asked the jurors, “Can
you remain fair and impartial?”76 The jurors responded, “yes,” and later convicted the
defendant.77 Unlike the 2010 case in which two jurors came forward, no jurors broke
the silence of the jurors’ deliberations. So we will never know if in addition to asking,
“is he guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” one or more jurors asked, “if we find him
not guilty, does he get to keep our portraits?”
A few questions arise: First, were jurors able to anxiously watch the defendant
draw them while simultaneously weighing the credibility of testifying witnesses,
weighing the evidence presented, and following all rulings on objections? Second, why
were the jurors observing the defendant at all? Certainly, his drawings or expressions
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 870.
See generally,, DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1478 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1471, 1478.
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had no impact on the legal merits of the evidence. Third, did the drawings make the
jurors fearful of setting the defendant free?
Consider another case involving a rape allegation. Naturally, the jurors swore
at the outset that they could rule impartially on the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
The female victim recounted how she had been drugged and raped by three men in
succession.78 What sets this case apart from others is not the “not guilty” verdict.
Rather, it is the fact that all eight jurors were smiling and posing for photos with one
of the defendants after trial. 79 This defendant was a first-round draft pick in the
National Basketball Association (NBA), was Rookie of the Year, and was named the
NBA’s Most Valuable Player. 80 He was Derrick Rose. Lest you suspect some
impropriety, the jurors made clear, “Rose’s stardom as one of the NBA’s most
prominent point guards played no role in their decision.”81
In the first case, the idea of a photo produced shock; however, in the second
case, it produced selfies. What unifies the two cases is one question: what legal
purpose does the juror’s view of the defendant serve if the defendant never testifies?
Better yet, why is the defendant present at all?
Put simply, the defendant’s presence is generally optional. The defendant’s
right to be present at his or her trial stems from the Confrontation Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and various statutes. 82 The key rights include the right of crossexamination, the right of face-to-face confrontation, and the defendant’s right to be
present at his or her trial. 83 The first Supreme Court decision to interpret the
Confrontation Clause stated the clause’s primary objective was “to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . [from] being used against the prisoner in lieu of
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness.”84 Historically, such ex
parte affidavits infamously led to the death of many who never had the opportunity
to question their accusers, as exemplified by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.85 The
court sentenced Raleigh to death for treason. The crucial evidence against him was
out-of-court statements by a witness who never appeared in court to testify, despite
Raleigh’s claims that the witness lied to save himself.86
Accordingly, the defendant’s most basic right under the Confrontation Clause
is “to be present in the courtroom at every stage of the defendant’s trial.”87 By being
78
79
80
81
82

83
84
85
86
87

Joel Rubin, Jury Finds Claim that NBA Star Derrick Rose and Two Friends Sexually Assaulted Woman
Not Credible, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-derrick-rose-verdict20161019-snap-story.html.
Id.
Derrick Rose, ESPN, http://www.espn.com/nba/player/_/id/3456/derrick-rose (last visited Sep. 17, 2017).
Rubin, supra note 78.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“the accused shall enjoy the right to… be confronted with the
witnesses against him”); Cal. Penal Code § 977 (“The accused may execute a written waiver of his or
her right to be personally present…”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 971.04 (“A defendant charged with a
misdemeanor may … be excused from attendance at any or all proceedings”).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
Id.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970).
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present, the defendant is able to defend against accusations and confront witnesses.
Thus, the Confrontation Clause does not protect the defendant’s presence per se;
rather it protects it as a means to an end. Yet even in 1895, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that this general rule, however valuable to the defendant, “must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the
case.”88
Courts originally inferred in dicta—apparently as an outgrowth of the right to
be present—a right of face-to-face confrontation. 89 Later, the Supreme Court held
that the “Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.”90 Notably, a face-to-face requirement is
not written in the Constitution.91 Scalia stated face-to-face interactions help ensure
the integrity of the fact-finding process because “[i]t is always more difficult to tell a
lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’”92 Scalia underscores the need
for the jury to view the witness’s behavior, as opposed to viewing the defendant’s
behavior, during this fact-finding process.93 Indeed, since 1895, the Supreme Court
has stressed the role of the jury to assess the witness—not the defendant—to
determine the witness’s credibility.94 Scalia also found it essential to “undo the false
accuser.” 95 Face-to-face confrontation, however, is not an indispensable element of
the Sixth Amendment; it is a preference.96 This preference may be outweighed by
public policy considerations and the necessities of the case.97 Although this preference
for physical, face-to-face confrontation may not be easily disregarded, important
public policy considerations can trump this right as long as the reliability of testimony
is otherwise assured.98 For instance, the need to admit hearsay statements made by
an absent declarant can trump this preference.99
88
89

90
91
92
93
94

95
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98
99

Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1985)
(per curiam)) (“The Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the
right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.”);
Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (“A fact which can be primarily established only by
witnesses cannot be proved against an accused . . . except by witnesses . . . upon whom he can look
while being tried . . . .”).
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (citing Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 748, 749–750 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019.
Id. (“The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the
defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions.”).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895) (“The primary object of the constitutional
provision . . . [is] [to compel the witness] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.”).
Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020 (“That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or
abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child
coached by a malevolent adult. It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.”).
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
Id. at 849–50 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243).
Id. at 850.
Id. at 849.
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When the defendant is not confronting witnesses, the Due Process Clause may
still ensure the defendant’s right to be present at trial, but only to the extent that the
defendant’s absence would impede a fair and just hearing.100 Additionally, federal
statutes and state rules or constitutions may codify the defendant’s right to be
present at trial.101
Ultimately, these aforementioned rights belong to the defendant, rather than
the State. Hence, the defendant may waive or forfeit his or her right to be physically
present in the courtroom.102 Likewise, other rights under the Sixth Amendment, such
as the right to confrontation, may be waived if performed intelligently and
knowingly.103
II.

CURRENT SOLUTIONS TO BIAS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Since the defendant’s mere physical presence might cause the judge or the jury
to become biased, it is imperative that courts consider alternatives to the status quo
to meet their obligation to impartiality.
A.

Court Solutions
i.

Bias in Judges

Although courts define bias broadly, instances of concealed or implicit bias will
virtually always fail to meet the burden for recusal. According to the U.S. Code, a
judge must recuse himself or herself in the case of “a personal bias or prejudice”
against any party to the proceeding.104 Judicial bias includes both the appearance of
bias as well as specific instances of bias in fact, such as when a judge has a financial
interest in the case.105 The Supreme Court explained that disqualification is triggered
by personal bias from an “extrajudicial source” that results “in an opinion on the
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the

100

101

102

103
104
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United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108
(1934)); e.g., State v. Dann, 74 P.3d 231, 245 (Ariz. 2003) (stating the defendant’s right to be present
does not extend to in-chambers pretrial conferences, brief bench conferences with attorneys, and
“various other conferences characterized as relating only to the resolution of questions of law.”).
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (“The defendant must be present at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial
arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return of the
verdict; and (3) sentencing.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1043 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 340.50 (2004);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.03 (2004).
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19–20 (1973) (stating waiver occurs when a defendant voluntarily
absents himself from the courtroom after proceedings have begun, but judicial warning is not required);
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (contrastingly, forfeiture occurs when a defendant’s conduct is
“so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in
the courtroom,” but the defendant must be warned by the court prior to his or her removal).
See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1966).
28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).
Id. at § 455.
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case.”106 The Third Circuit developed a three-part test for judicial disqualification in
which the movant carries the burden: “1. The facts must be material and stated with
particularity; 2. The facts must be such that, if true they would convince a reasonable
man that a bias exists; and 3. The facts must show the bias is personal, as opposed to
judicial, in nature.” 107 In practice, this is a very difficult burden to meet, except for
obvious cases of familial or financial conflicts.108
Judges must also adhere to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code
of Judicial Conduct (CJC), which sets their ethical standards. 109 According to the
CJC, a judge must “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the . . . impartiality of the judiciary, and [must] avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.”110 The CJC’s preamble recognizes that a “fair and impartial judiciary
is indispensable to our system of justice.” 111 Accordingly, judges “should aspire at all
times to conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their . . .
impartiality.” 112 Ultimately, both rules mandate that a judge who, in fact, acts
impartially still must be disqualified when the mere appearance of personal bias
arises.
ii.

Bias in Jurors

Due Process and the Sixth Amendment both independently require an
impartial and indifferent jury.113 “The bias or prejudice of even a single juror would
violate [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial.” 114 Although impartiality is defined as
“a state of mind,” there is no particular test or procedure to ascertain whether a juror
is impartial. 115 In the absence of a standardized test, trial judges are given wide
latitude to determine whether a juror is impartial. 116 Courts may consider the
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
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United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22,
31 (1921)).
United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Berger, 255 U.S. at 31).
See When Do Supreme Court Justices Recuse Themselves?, SLATE (Oct. 2, 2000, 5:54PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2000/10/when_do_supreme_court_justices_re
cuse_themselves.html.
MODEL RULES OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.1, pmbl. (AM. BAR AAA’N 2010).
Id. at r. 1.2.
Id. at pmbl.
Id.
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965)).
Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998).
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724–25 (1961) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–46
(1936)) (“Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this
mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no particular tests and
procedure is not chained to any ancient and artificial formula.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1996) (“We do not minimize the
importance to criminal defendants of removing the possibility of racial bias on the jury. How best to do
that, however, is primarily left to the broad discretion of the district court.”); DeVaughn v. State, 769
S.E.2d 70, 74 (Ga. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 56, (2015) (“The trial court has broad discretion to
determine a potential juror's impartiality and to strike for cause jurors who may not be fair and
impartial.”); State v. Lucky, 96-1687 (La. 4/13/99); 755 So. 2d 845, 850 (“Not every predisposition or
leaning in any direction rises to the level of substantial impairment. Significantly, it is in the
determination of substantial impairment that the trial judge's broad discretion plays the critical role.”);
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following factors when deciding juror impartiality: preconceived notions,117 opinions,118
views,119 biases or prejudices,120 and prior knowledge or impressions.121 Ultimately,
the defendant carries the burden of demonstrating a juror’s bias.122
The courts recognize two types of biases held by jurors: actual bias and implied
123
bias. Actual bias—the more common of the two—is “bias in fact,” or a state of mind
that indicates the person will not act completely impartially.124 Examples include
where a juror states he or she cannot be impartial, where a juror has a specific
negative experience with one of the parties and equivocates on whether he or she can
be impartial, and where a juror expressed doubts about being impartial in a case that
involved an offense similar to the one the juror had been convicted of.125 Thus, actual
bias is typically ascertained by evidence obtained on voir dire.126
Alternatively, implied bias is “conclusively presumed as a matter of law.”127
The issue is “whether an average person in the position of the juror in controversy
would be prejudiced.” 128 Jurors found to harbor implied biases “must be recused even
where the juror affirmatively asserts (or even believes) that he or she can and will be
impartial.”129 Examples of implied bias include a juror who had a personal experience
similar to the fact pattern in the current trial, a juror who knew of highly prejudicial
information about the defendant, a juror whose children were convicted of using the
drug involved in the current case, a juror who failed to disclose that her brother was
murdered while on a murder case, and jurors deliberating on a robbery and murder
case who coincidentally experienced a hotel room break-in.130 Consequently, findings
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Commonwealth v. Stroyny, 760 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Mass. 2002) (“Whether to accept the declaration of
a juror that he or she is disinterested lies within the broad discretion of the trial judge.”); Murff v. Pass,
249 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2008) (“Because trial judges are present in the courtroom and are in the best
position to evaluate the sincerity and attitude of individual panel members, they are given wide
latitude in both conducting voir dire proceedings and in determining whether a panel member is
impermissibly partial.”).
State v. Iuli, 65 P.3d 143, 151 (Haw. 2003) (citing State v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1989)).
United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A juror is considered to be impartial
‘only if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.’”)
(citations omitted).
State v. White, 693 N.E.2d 772, 777 (Ohio 1998) (“[T]he court must determine whether the prospective
juror's views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980))).
Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 257 (Fla. 2004) (“The test for determining juror competency is whether
the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice.” (citing Lusk v. State 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1984))).
State v. Jaynes, 549 S.E.2d 179, 190 (N.C. 2001).
See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S 145, 157
(1878)).
Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Torres, 128
F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Id.
Id. at 1111–13.
Id. at 1111 (citing 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 266 (1995)).
Id. at 1112 (quoting United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1260—61 (10th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1112–13.
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of both actual and implied biases require a juror to be aware of, and to report, possible
conflicts or require concrete evidence of conflicts.
This is our sole safeguard against bias. Hence, the juror with concealed biases
will continue to be selected for juries. The African-American judge who is more
lenient with African-American defendants will continue to provide disparate
sentences, just as the Caucasian judge who hands out disproportionately harsh
sentences to African-American defendants will continue to provide those disparate
sentences. These practices will continue because our system fails to detect and to
address concealed and implicit biases. Because of this long felt, but unsolved, need to
inhibit bias in the courtroom, scholars have proposed a multitude of suggestions for
both judges and jurors. As we will see, however, these solutions merely offer a bandaid solution.
B.

Academic Proposals
i.

Bias in Judges
a.

Training

One proposal is testing and training sessions to mitigate bias amongst judges.
This method is gaining traction as more than 250 federal immigration judges
attended a mandatory anti-bias training session in August 2016. 131 A paper cowritten by law professors at Cornell and Vanderbilt, along with a U.S. District Court
judge, explains this approach and its limitations. 132 First, testing may be
accomplished through the IAT.133 The testing results will not disqualify or have any
other practical impact on judges, other than informing them of potential bias. 134
Second, they suggest providing training sessions on bias, without providing specifics
on how to conduct such sessions. 135 The authors acknowledge the procedure’s
limitations: “there is a risk of insufficient correction, unnecessary correction, or even
overcorrection” that results in a distorted decision.136
Other drawbacks to training exist. First, training sessions are not equipped to
address the plethora of biases that may shift over time; positive or negative biases
can derive from subjective ideas of beauty, danger, intelligence, culture, and religion,
all of which go far beyond simplistic concepts of racial biases. Second, these training
sessions are unlikely to overwrite a lifetime of mental associations that produce
biases. It is unlikely that biases, which must first be identified, will be overwritten in
two hours or two months. After all, judges appeared to retain the same biases for
131
132
133
134
135
136

Caitlin Dickerson, How U.S. Immigration Judges Battle Their Own Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/us/us-immigration-judgesbias.html?emc=edit_ca_20161005&nl=california-today&nlid=70044346&te=1&_r=1.
Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1226–27.
Id. at 1198–99, 1227.
Id. at 1227—28.
See id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.
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wealth that children shared in independent studies. Third, the simulated sessions
are unlikely to translate to lasting changes in practice. The concepts of ego depletion
and cognitive load explain that efforts to maintain will or self-control are tiring: “if
you have had to force yourself to do something, you are less willing or less able to
exert self-control when the next challenge comes around.”137 Judge Dana Marks, an
immigration judge, explained that massive caseloads frustrate the ability to
methodically check one’s biases: “‘[W]ould I treat a young person the same way I’m
treating this old person?’ she said. 'Would I treat a black person the same way I’m
treating this white person? This situation of rush, rush, rush as fast as we can go, it’s
not conducive to doing that.’”138 Fourth, these training sessions may produce a cobra
effect due to a normalization of stereotypes; research shows that training sessions
that increase awareness of stereotypes led participants to express more stereotypes
than those who received no awareness training.139
b.

Exposure

A second approach involves “stereotype-incongruent models” or exposure to
counter-typical associations.140 This model posits that a person’s bias against a group
will cease upon exposure to group members who lack that stereotypical feature.141
This may be accomplished by “direct contact with countertypical people,” or “vicarious
contact” through the use of “images, videos, simulations, or even imagination.” 142 For
example, posting a picture of Obama alongside judges who have a bias against black
defendants theoretically mitigates the bias.143
Yet, the debiasing effects of vicarious contact have already been proven to be
minor.144 When a jurisdiction consisted of roughly half white judges and half black
judges, white judges still showed a “strong set of implicit biases.”145 This model may
also introduce a cobra effect by inversing a negative bias to a positive bias rather than
neutralizing the bias altogether. Additionally, it seems suited for race at the expense
of other abstract biases that may derive from political associations or concepts of
beauty.

c.
137
138
139
140
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144
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Self-Improvement

KAHNEMAN, supra note 70, at 41–42.
Dickerson, supra note 130.
See Michelle M. Duguid & Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt, Condoning Stereotyping? How Awareness of
Stereotyping Prevalence Impacts Expression of Stereotypes, 100 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 343, 352 (2015).
Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1226; Kang et al., supra note 9, at 1169 (“One potentially effective
strategy is to expose ourselves to countertypical associations.”).
Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1169.
Id. at 1170–71.
See Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1227.
Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1172.
Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1227.
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A third approach seeks to break the causal effect of bias on a judge’s decisionmaking, rather than eliminating the bias, through three steps: (1) by doubting one’s
objectivity; (2) by increasing one’s motivation to be fair; and (3) by improving
conditions of one’s decision making.146 The second step is accomplished by persuading
judges that a genuine problem exists through self-study, while the third step
encourages “judges to take special care when they must respond quickly” and
encourages them to avoid elevated emotional states such as anger against certain
social categories.147
The self-improvement approach faces many of the same limitations already
discussed. First, it is clear that people overrate their objectivity and likewise, may
miscalculate how much skepticism is required. Also, judges already have motivation
to be fair due to ethical and legal obligations. Self-study is commendable, but it is
neither standardized nor measurable. It also imposes increasing time commitments
for judges. Additionally, encouraging judges to slowly deliberate and to avoid certain
emotions just fails to account for the practical realities of increasing docket loads and
inherently emotional trials.
d.

Audits

Fourth, scholars propose judges should undertake audits of their judicial
decisions.148 For example, Kang suggests that judges adopt an accountability model,
whereby judges record all of their rulings to help reveal biases through a history of
data points.149 Kang argues such knowledge will create a negative feedback loop that
will allow them to make corrective changes based on evidence of biased
performance.150
Kang, however, readily admits some limitations: judges may “lack both the
quantitative training and the resources to track their own performance statistics.” 151
Beyond this, auditing fails to account for ego depletion due to overwhelming dockets.
More importantly, the argument that knowledge of biased decisions creates a
negative feedback loop runs counter to overwhelming evidence of how habits are
formed.152 The cue for biased judgment is not obliviousness to the bias, the cue is the
defendant. For example, an alcoholic knows drinking is harmful, but the sight of a
beer bottle may trigger a habit loop just as the sight of a defendant may trigger
implicit biases. This is a reactive remedy rather than a proactive solution, and an
unproven one at that.
146
147
148
149
150
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Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1172–77.
Id. at 1174, 1177.
Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1226, 1230; see Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1178.
Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1178–79.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
See CHARLES DUHIGG, THE POWER OF HABIT: WHY WE DO WHAT WE DO IN LIFE AND BUSINESS (2012)
(Habits involve a “three-step loop”: (1) a cue “that tells your brain to go into automatic mode”; (2) a
routine, “which can be physical or mental or emotional”; and (3) a reward.).
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Procedural Changes

Last, scholars recommend that judges alter courtroom practices. 153 Some
examples include expanding “the use of three-judge courts” or increasing “appellate
scrutiny” by “employing de novo review rather than clear error review.” 154
The author readily concedes that employing a three-judge panel may be too
costly or too inefficient. 155 The author fails to account for another effect: biased
appeals. Research suggests that black judges are consistently overturned more often
than white judges, even when accounting for variables such as ideological
differences.156 Substitution of one bias for another is no remedy.
ii.

Bias in Jurors

Scholars offer distinct recommendations to reduce bias amongst jurors, except
for the aforementioned suggestion of exposure to counter-typical associations.157
a.

Screening

Individual screening is advocated as a method to screen out jurors with
excessively high biases. 158 Yet, questions abound: how much is too much? Which
biases will be tested? Will this produce satellite litigation over unreliable IATs?
b.

Diversity

Jury diversity may cancel out the biases of other jurors by way of increasing
the pool of biases.159
While juror diversity may be more effective in reaching a fair decision, this
solution seeks to increase biases rather than mitigating or eliminating them.
Accordingly, it is fraught with unforeseen consequences. For example, a juror pool
with Asians, Caucasians, and Latinos may still hold the same implicit biases toward
Native Americans. Likewise, increasing the pool of African-Americans may still
result in a unanimous bias against African-Americans. Moreover, increasing
diversity may simply trigger concealed bias. Besides, with a maximum of twelve
jurors, it is unlikely to account for every bias that might occur at trial and it would
be costly to mandate a representative of every group.
153
154
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Rachlinski et al., supra note 50, at 1231.
Id.
Id.
Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S187, S220–
21 (2015).
See Kang et al., supra note 14, at 1169, 1179–86.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1180–81.
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Instructions

Scholars also propose jury instructions to mitigate implicit bias in jurors.160
Kang concedes no empirical studies have tested the effectiveness of this model, but
argues such instruction is “likely to do more good than harm.”161 In fact, a similar
system has been tested and failed because of the cobra effect. After considerable
research about flaws in eyewitness testimony emerged, New Jersey enacted a law
requiring judges to give instructions whenever a case involved eyewitness
testimony. 162 These jury instructions informed jurors of the current status of
eyewitness research and gave them factors to decide whether such testimony was
reliable.163 The jury instructions accomplished the complete opposite of the intended
effect: in practice, jurors became skeptical of “all eyewitness testimony—even
testimony that should be considered reasonably reliable.” 164 In this case, jury
instructions about implicit bias may have similar unintended effects. Another study
found that seemingly innocuous instructions regarding the presumption of innocence
actually may trigger racial stereotypes. 165 Hence, incorporating more jury
instructions may simply add confusion for jurors, or worse, trigger biases that might
not occur otherwise.
d.

Category-conscious strategies

Last, Kang recommends category-conscious strategies—which entail jurors
explicitly discussing their biases amongst fellow jurors—and perspective shifting
strategies, whereby jurors try empathizing with a party to the case or with other
ethnicities by metaphorically stepping into their shoes.166
This model requires jurors to be aware of all biases, which ignores the reality
of implicit bias.167 Moreover, this model would further delay trial proceedings and
risk jurors digressing into long conversations completely unrelated to the evidence.
The goal for jurors is to weigh, and most importantly, remember the evidence. This
solution risks undermining both of those tasks. Notably, this solution assumes jurors
will reveal their concealed biases. According to the Bradley effect—a theory based on
the failed political run by Tom Bradley, an African American who lost despite being
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Id. at 1181–82.
Id. at 1183–84.
Nell Greenfieldboyce, A Judge’s Guidance Makes Jurors Suspicious of Any Eyewitness, NPR (Jan. 26,
2016, 5:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/01/26/464300484/a-judges-guidancemakes-jurors-suspicious-of-any-eyewitness.
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ahead in the polls—concealed biases may be hidden even from strangers in order to
appear politically correct.168
iii.

Virtual Avatars

Adam Benforado, a law professor at Drexel University, offers an allencompassing, unique solution that deserves its own section: he suggests dispensing
with live trials and replacing them with trials consisting of virtual avatars.169 Neutral
avatars would replace every person in the court, including judges, attorneys,
defendants, and jurors.170 The avatar system would also standardize everyone’s voice,
presumably akin to voice disguisement, so that any identifiable accents are
removed. 171 Additionally, the virtual environment would be standardized so that
courtroom colors, lighting, heights of physical objects, and any other variability of a
physical courtroom is negated.172 Benforado also recommends broadcasting criminal
trials to “supplement[] the spotty error- and bias-checking done by attorneys and
judges with crowdsourced oversight.” 173 Benforado argues witness demeanor is
irrelevant, asserting “traditional justifications—particularly that judges and jurors
need to be able to take in a witness’s entire demeanor—just do not stack up against
the science.”174 He claims, “In most trials, there is no compelling reason for jurors to
inspect the defendant, witness, or attorney in the flesh.”175 He contends judges should
“stop instructing [jurors] to focus on demeanor evidence . . . [or] simply . . . bar [jurors]
from observing demeanor altogether.”176 Benforado also suggests the virtual system
will help eliminate attorney and judicial bias towards jurors.177
These methods of removing bias from the courtroom are unconstitutional, clash
with scientific studies, and are impractical. Scalia mused, “[it] is difficult to imagine
a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant's right to a face-to-face
encounter” than the placement of a screen between the criminal defendant and
testifying witness.178 The constitutional violations of a physical screen in Coy pale in
comparison to the constitutional violations of an avatar system. An avatar system
would re-introduce “the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use
of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused,” which was the primary
evil the Confrontation Clause sought to eradicate.179 Assuming avatars will take an
oath and may be cross-examined, the avatars will nevertheless discard a central
168
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Bradley Effect, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradley_effect (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
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element of the Confrontation Clause: “[O]bservation of demeanor by the trier of
fact.”180
Scalia championed face-to-face confrontation, noting it is harder “to lie ‘[to
someone’s] face’ than ‘behind his [or her] back.’”181 Alternatively, Benforado suggests
an avatar system and claims “there is no compelling reason for jurors to inspect the
. . . witness . . . in the flesh.” 182 According to science, however, Scalia is closest to the
truth.
One study squarely addresses this question of whether it is easier to lie to
someone’s face or easier to lie in a virtual environment.183 The study concluded that
people are less likely to detect highly motivated liars’ deception in virtual
environments than via face-to-face interactions.184 Although this study compared text
messaging with face-to-face interactions, a text-messaging system is analogous to
Benforado’s avatar system because the avatars would be devoid of expression,
mannerisms, and vocal changes.185 The study reasoned that a digital environment
facilitates deception because it removes “nonverbal and vocal behavior” that help
viewers determine whether one is lying: behaviors include “facial characteristics like
gaze aversion, smile duration, eye blinking or broken eye contact;” “bodily movements
like self-manipulations, illustrators, and shifting (or rigid) body positions;” and other
vocal properties.186
In addition to the legal and scientific hurdles of such a proposal, Benforado’s
virtual avatar system is impractical and raises more questions than answers. No
logistics are mentioned, and without more, such a system cannot be implemented
even if it did not run afoul of the Constitution.
III.

THE DOUBLE-BLIND SYSTEM
A.

Overview

The Double-Blind System stops biases where our current system and other
proposals fail to do so. It works by removing the defendant from view, thereby
precluding any biases—whether concealed, implicit, or currently undefined—from
occurring at the source. Its simplicity is its core function, allowing juries to focus on
the evidence rather than falling susceptible to unavoidable biases. Moreover, this
procedure can be accomplished using technology and procedures that already exist in
the courtroom. In a single-blind system, the jury will no longer view or hear the
180
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defendant in a criminal trial, except when the defendant testifies by right. In a
double-blind system, both the jury and the judge will no longer view or hear the
defendant, except when the defendant testifies.
i.

The Defendant

The defendant may be housed in the jail conference room, in the attorney-client
meeting room located adjacent to the courtroom, in the room normally reserved for
child witness examinations, or another room approved by the judge. The defendant
will be able to use any items that he normally would have access to, such as writing
utensils and paper. The defendant will have uninterrupted access to audio channels
to communicate with defense counsel at all times. The defendant also will have a twoway closed-circuit television (CCTV) that allows live face-to-face confrontation with
all witnesses. The defendant's TV monitor can also include a picture-in-picture option
to view courtroom demonstrations and the jury. The defendant’s name will be
substituted with initials, as is done in cases involving minors, to prevent inferences
based on the name.
ii.

The Witness

The witness stand would be equipped with a two-way CCTV monitor that
contains a clear view of the defendant. In child sexual assault cases, this monitor
could be turned off pursuant to court discretion and case-specific findings: in these
cases, the two-way CCTV would be switched to one-way CCTV, whereby the
defendant can see and hear the witness but the witness would not see or hear the
defendant. To be clear, this one-way use will be limited to a very narrow set of cases
that are already allowed under precedent, including Coy and Craig.187 Otherwise, the
monitor will always present a face-to-face view of the defendant, just as the
defendant’s monitor will show a clear view of the witness during live testimony. The
witness will be unable to hear the defendant. All in-court identifications of the
defendant will be made by the witness through a closed-circuit television or in court
outside of the jury’s presence.
iii.

The Jury

The jury will be unable to see or hear the defendant at all times. Importantly,
the jury will always view witnesses as they have for hundreds of years: via the
witness stand. Even in cases of child sexual assault, the jury will always view the
child witness as the witness testifies from the witness stand. This is a major
improvement on the current system, which allows children who are overcome by fear
of the defendant to testify outside the presence of the jury.188
187
188
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The Judge

Under a double-blind setup, the judge will be unable to see or hear the
defendant, akin to the jury in a single-blind setup. In a single-blind setup, the judge’s
role remains unchanged.
B.

The Constitutionality of the Double-Blind System

The Sixth Amendment reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed . . . [and the right] to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . .”189
In order to understand the policies behind the Double-Blind System, it is
critical to understand how three cases established the bedrock of face-to-face
constitutional analysis.
i.

Witness Screens

In Coy, Iowa enacted a statute that authorized the placement of a screen
between the defendant and alleged underage victims of sexual assault who testified
against that defendant.190 The screen made it impossible for the testifying victims to
see the defendant during trial, but the defendant was able to see the witnesses dimly
through the screen.191 On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the screen violated
appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to face-to-face confrontation because the screen
blocked the witness’s view of the defendant. 192 Yet, without addressing specific
exceptions, the Court acknowledged the “rights conferred by the Confrontation
Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other important interests.” 193 The Court
clarified that any potential exception must “further an important public policy.”194
Although the Court did not address the possibility of using closed-circuit television,
O’Connor suggested that such technology “may raise no substantial Confrontation
Clause problem since they involve testimony in the presence of the defendant.”195
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Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
Id. at 1012.
See id. at 1020, 1022.
Id. at 1020.
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Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

Two years later, the Supreme Court identified a specific exception to the right
of face-to-face confrontation: cases involving sexual abuse of minors.196 In Craig, the
State accused the defendant of sexually abusing a six-year-old child.197 Fearing the
child would suffer serious emotional distress upon seeing the defendant in court, the
State invoked a statutory procedure that allowed testimony via one-way closed-circuit
television that prevented the witness from seeing the defendant but still allowed the
defendant to view the witness.198 The Court ruled the procedure to be constitutional,
explaining, “‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial,’ a preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations
of public policy and the necessities of the case.’”199 The Court underscored that the
preference is not easily dispensed with.200 Rather, “a defendant’s right to confront
accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at
trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important
public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”201
The Court clarified, “the presence of . . . other elements of confrontation—oath, crossexamination, and observation of the witness' demeanor—adequately ensures that the
testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner
functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.” 202
In Craig, the Court held the “State’s interest in the physical and psychological
well-being of child abuse victims” constitutes an important state interest, as long as
the State makes “an adequate showing of necessity,” which must be a case-specific
inquiry.203 In cases of child abuse victims, necessity is shown when the defendant,
rather than the courtroom, traumatizes the child witness.204
In 2004, the Court’s test for the admissibility of out-of-court statements
changed from one based on “reliability” to whether the statements were “testimonial”
in Crawford v. Washington.205 Crawford held the Confrontation Clause bars out-ofcourt statements that are testimonial, unless witnesses are unavailable and
defendants had prior opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, regardless of whether
such statements are deemed reliable. 206 Some may question whether Craig’s
interpretation survives the analysis provided by Crawford, which rejects the idea that
the Confrontation Clause generally protects evidentiary reliability. 207 It is an
196
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important question for cases similar to Craig because the minors testified out of court,
without face-to-face confrontation. In Crawford, Scalia explained the Confrontation
Clause ensures reliability of evidence procedurally through cross-examination, rather
than ensuring the reliability of evidence substantively. 208 In other words, the
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee evidence is reliable; it only guarantees
evidence is scrutinized, which normally should result in reliable evidence. 209
Ultimately, courts and commentators agree Crawford did not overrule Craig. 210
Under the Double-Blind System, this question is irrelevant, since witnesses always
testify in court, unlike what occurs under Craig exceptions. Hence, a Crawford
analysis is never triggered.
iii.

Current Law

Maryland v. Craig still governs the use of testimony via CCTV where the
defendant is denied a physical face-to-face confrontation. This legal standard applies
to both formats of the Double-Blind System, which incorporates a two-way, closedcircuit television except in the rare situations that call for one-way testimony under
Craig. As mentioned, one-way CCTV is only permissible when: (1) denial of physical,
face-to-face confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy, and (2)
the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. 211 Under the Double-Blind
System, the latter is assured because the witness always testifies in court, and a
virtual face-to-face encounter creates no material differences from its physical
counterpart. Thus, the last step for determining whether the Double-Blind System is
constitutional depends on whether or not it furthers an important public policy. Until
courts endorse the Double-Blind System as a bright-line rule, this finding must be
case-specific, and the following public policies may enable the Double-Blind System
to be employed today.
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The Double-Blind System Furthers Numerous Public Policies and
Compelling State Interests
i.

The Double-Blind System Furthers Jury Impartiality and
Legitimacy

“Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free
from outside influences.” 212 Due process necessitates a jury that is both “capable and
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”213 Most importantly, the
Sixth Amendment mandates that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed.”214 As previously demonstrated, jurors are often incapable
of mechanically ignoring biases—whether explicit, concealed, or implicit—toward a
defendant. According to the Constitution and the Due Process Clause, the interest in
securing jury impartiality alone should enable the Double-Blind System.
Considering the demographics of America, an all-white jury pool may be both
common and cause for alarm. This is not a new concern. Ironically, our Founders also
feared an all-white jury when Britain attempted to outsource juries for crimes that
occurred in the colonies during the late eighteenth century. 215 A study by Duke
University found that “all-white jury pools in Florida convicted black defendants 16
percent more often than white defendants, a gap that was nearly eliminated when at
least one member of the jury pool was black.”216 This disparity may exacerbate public
sentiment towards highly-charged cases, such as police killings. However, increased
confidence in unbiased and principled procedures may increase the public’s
acceptance of verdicts, regardless of the preferred outcome.217
The Double-Blind System reduces the appearance of partiality and potential
biases that result from a homogenous jury by eliminating the jury’s view of the
defendant. As one columnist said, “all-white juries risk undermining the perception
of justice in minority communities, even if a mixed-race jury would have reached the
same verdict or imposed the same sentence.”218
Of course, all-white juries are not offensive in themselves. Rather, it’s the
perception that tribalism may render a biased verdict against the defendant, who is
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a cultural outsider. This concern is rooted in the same fears our Founders held. Thus,
a court’s legitimacy will be improved because one causal connection between a biased
jury and a biased verdict will be severed.
ii.

The Double-Blind System Ensures the Reliability of Evidence

The four procedural elements that ensure the reliability of evidence, pursuant
to the Confrontation Clause, include (1) the witness’s physical presence; (2) witness
statements given under oath, which signals the seriousness of the matter and guards
against lying due to the consequences of perjury; (3) cross-examination; and (4)
observation of the witness’s demeanor by the trier of fact.219 Under the Double-Blind
System, the witness always testifies in court. Thus significant gains are made in
sexual abuse trials involving minors, who often testify outside of the jury’s presence.
In one case involving a minor, the court had no control over the examination
process, the camera failed to show a complete view of the witness, and the examiner
and an unauthorized individual conducted part of the child’s examination.220 None of
those circumstances, which impermissibly ran afoul of the Confrontation Clause’s
procedural elements, would occur under the Double-Blind System. Obviously, an
incomplete view of the witness undermines the jury’s primary objective under the
Confrontation Clause: the ability “to stand face to face with the [witness] in order
that [the jury] may look at [the witness], and judge by [the witness’s] demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which [the witness] gives [the witness’s] testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.”221 The proposed solution, rather than undermining
that objective, ensures it by always placing the witness in the witness stand.
Second, the mere separation of the child witness from the courtroom, for
example, through videotaped depositions, may create biases against the defendant.
One study found that jurors who viewed videotaped depositions of underage victims
of sexual assaults were more certain of a defendant’s guilt than jurors who viewed
similar testimony in court. 222 The study also concluded that jurors may speculate
about the defendant’s harmful effect on a child when both are physically present in
the same room, thereby opening the door for undue considerations.223 These results
suggest that defendants may be prejudiced by excluding child witnesses on an ad hoc
basis. The Double-Blind System, however, would eliminate such prejudice by
normalizing the absence of the defendant. As a result, there will be no speculation as
to why the defendant and the witness are not in the same room. More importantly,
there will be no presumption that the separation of the defendant from the witness
is due to the court’s determination that the defendant may pose a danger to the
witness.
219
220
221
222
223

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990).
Nebraska v. Warford, 389 N.W.2d 575, 579, 582 (1986).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
See Janet K. Swim, Eugene Borgida & Kathy McCoy, Videotaped Versus In-Court Witness Testimony:
Does Protecting the Child Witness Jeopardize Due Process?, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 603, 621
(1993).
See id. at 627.

2018]

Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom

iii.

75

The Double-Blind System Increases Efficiency and Maintains
Juror Secrecy

Since the connection between demographic profiles of the jury will be severed
from the demographic profile of the defendant, the Double-Blind System may result
in a significant reduction of Batson hearings. Relatedly, the amount of appeals that
pertain to biases held by judges or jurors may drop precipitously. For instance, the
case involving the biased juror who presumed the defendant was guilty precisely
because the defendant is Mexican is unlikely to be replicated under this system, let
alone make its way to the Supreme Court. Future appeals may raise issues of bias
towards witnesses, victims of crimes, or attorneys. Yet, the majority of cases likely
involve prejudice directed towards the defendant. Consequently, court costs should
decline along with docket loads that pertain to bias. Similarly, the Double-Blind
System would avert future inquiries into piercing secret deliberations by jurors due
to allegations of bias.
iv.

The Double-Blind System Reduces Suggestibility and Eyewitness
Misidentification

The Supreme Court noted, “[I]t is in the prosecution’s interest as well as the
accused’s that witnesses’ identifications remain untainted,” so all parties agree
suggestibility should be reduced. 224 The Double-Blind System shares the same
underlying flaws of suggestibility as current in-court identification procedures, but it
improves upon the flaws of suggestibility in several regards.
Any witness—especially those who have seen trials on television—can
determine who the defendant is in a trial. 225 In most cases, no objection is made,
despite this suggestibility, when a witness is asked to identify the defendant. 226
Objections that argue a defendant’s presence at defense counsel’s table is
impermissibly suggestive are routinely dismissed. 227 The Second Circuit noted,
“[T]here is always the question how far in-court identification is affected by the
witness’ observing the defendant at the counsel table.” 228 Indeed, this in-court
identification seems “perfunctory.”229 Courts are concerned with the current model of
in-court identification and suggest that steps should be taken to ensure the process
is fair by avoiding a procedure that amounts to a show-up.230 Although a trial court
may not necessarily grant this request, the Supreme Court proposes that one method
224
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of reducing in-court identification suggestibility may be accomplished by seating the
defendant with other members of the trial audience.231 Many cases will exist where
the audience in a courtroom is non-existent or does not resemble the defendant in any
fashion. For example, the defendant may be the only black person in the courtroom.232
In these situations, the Supreme Court’s recommendation is impractical. Moreover,
placing a defendant, especially in extremely violent cases, with the audience poses a
threat to the public and the courtroom generally. The defendant also poses a flight
risk by remaining closer to the exit.
The Double-Blind System, although subject to the flaw of suggestibility,
improves upon the current method in the following ways: (1) It eliminates
suggestibility by the defendant’s mere propinquity to defense counsel, (2) it adds the
possibility of including other defendants in the picture during identification, and (3)
it allows the witness to view the defendant close-up or at distances representative of
the original encounter.
There is no added suggestibility by employing the Double-Blind System, yet
many possibilities exist to sharply reduce suggestibility. Although it is unlikely for
the bailiff to bring a string of defendants into the courtroom who superficially
resemble the defendant, it may be more easily accomplished in a room separate from
the public and judge. Defendants normally are not shackled because of the prejudicial
effect upon the jury and its effect on the decorum and dignity of judicial
proceedings. 233 If the defendant is not present in the courtroom, that concern is
irrelevant, so multiple shackled defendants may be momentarily placed in a room at
the same time without jeopardizing public safety. Thus, the eyewitness’s ability to
distinguish the defendant from other inmates at the time of trial will forward the
State’s and defense counsel’s interests in ensuring the eyewitness identification is
accurate. After all, eyewitness misidentification is “the greatest contributing factor
to wrongful convictions proven by DNA testing, playing a role in more than 70 percent
of convictions overturned through DNA testing nationwide.” 234 Additionally, if a
defendant remains in a separate, guarded room, the flight and safety risks are
virtually eliminated.
The distance at which an eyewitness sees a person can affect the reliability of
the identification.235 Specifically, distance is proportional to the amount of detail one
can perceive about a person, such as the person’s face.236 Hence, the further away
someone is, the blurrier that person will appear. 237 Although this fact might be
obvious, the courtroom identification procedure does not take this into account. The
witness stand sits at a considerable distance from the defense table, thereby
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automatically blurring the defendant’s features. Consider myopia—also known as
nearsightedness—a condition that causes distant objects to appear abnormally blurry
though close objects appear normal. A witness who is robbed at gunpoint and suffers
from myopia may clearly identify the defendant in a photo array but may hesitate to
identify the same person while on the witness stand due to her vision. Although the
State may argue that more weight should be placed on the defendant’s identification
the night of the robbery, the jury may conclude that the witness’s memory is faulty
rather than her vision. Of course, the witness will look right at the defense counsel’s
table but may nevertheless falter because of the blurriness of the defendant. This
causes needless and possibly erroneous speculation on the part of the jury, which can
be exploited by either party. Alternatively, this new model can correct for this. The
distance from the defendant on the night of the incident can be replicated with the
camera. While hardly any court would have the eyewitness stand at arm’s length
from the defendant during trial to make a positive identification, the Double-Blind
System could implement this method in every trial.
v.

The Double-Blind System Increases Safety

The Double-Blind System will also prevent violence that occurs in courthouses
by eliminating the defendant’s presence. Violence that occurs in a courthouse is often
committed by or against a defendant. In July 2016, a handcuffed inmate seized a gun
from a sheriff and killed two bailiffs in a Michigan courthouse.238 In September 2016,
a defendant appeared to pull a weapon out of his sleeve and lunged towards a
prosecutor during trial.239 In 2011, a defendant punched a district attorney to the
ground during a sentencing hearing in Oklahoma. 240 Defendants have also been
victims. In April 2014, a U.S. marshal shot and killed a defendant after the defendant
aggressively rushed towards a witness with a pen.241 In June 2016, a father of a slain
18-year-old woman attacked a smirking defendant during trial.242 In 2015, a father
punched a defendant being sentenced for the murder of his three-year-old daughter
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in Detroit. 243 These incidents highlight findings by the National Center for State
Courts that violent acts in courthouses are steadily increasing, despite increased
security.244
The Double-Blind System will increase the safety of courtroom personnel, the
public, and the defendant because all of the aforementioned incidents would be
impossible. The defendant will be kept in a separate room that bailiffs will oversee.
Thus, the defendant is unable to physically interact with other court personnel, and,
likewise, the public will be unable to interact with the defendant. Since this model
incorporates two-way CCTV, victims may still address defendants during appropriate
phases of trial, but neither party will physically interact.
D.

Criticisms of the Double-Blind System
i.

Virtual Confrontation is Unequal

Critics may argue a virtual face-to-face encounter is not tantamount to its
physical, face-to-face counterpart, and thus is not a constitutional equivalent. The
Eighth Circuit stated that two-way CCTV is not constitutionally equivalent to
physical, face-to-face confrontation because a virtual confrontation does not “provide
the same truth-inducing effect.”245 But its only evidence to the contrary—that virtual
confrontations do not induce the same truth-inducing effect as physical
confrontations—spanned merely one sentence: “Given the ubiquity of television, even
children are keenly aware that a television image of a person (including a defendant
in the case of a two-way system) is not the person—something is lost in the
translation.” 246 Other courts offer conclusory statements, citing opinions in a
seemingly circular fashion, for this same proposition. 247 The Eighth Circuit
hypothesized that intangible elements may be lost in a virtual medium.248 As a result,
the court concluded, “[A] defendant watching a witness through a monitor will not
have the same truth-inducing effect as an unmediated gaze across the courtroom.”249
Before dissecting this concept, it is important to note that the Supreme Court
rejects this notion that the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause is
243
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impermissibly voided when employing virtual confrontation, even when the witness
is completely unable to see the defendant.250 In fact, the Court explained that both
the truth-seeking functions and symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause are
preserved with closed-circuit television if all other elements of the Confrontation
Clause exist: (1) The witness competently testifies under oath; (2) “The defendant
retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and (3) The judge,
jury, and defendant are able to view . . . the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he
or she testifies.251
Since the “truth-inducing effect” is the sole premise that the court proffers for
the need of a physical, face-to-face, unmediated gaze by the witness upon the
defendant, the key question is does the data support the unsubstantiated dogma?
A study from Cornell University compared four mediums—telephone, face-toface, instant messaging, and email—and found three interdependent factors that
affect one’s likelihood to deceive someone: (1) the degree to which messages are
exchanged instantaneously and in real-time, (2) the degree to which the interaction
is automatically documented, and (3) whether or not the speaker and listener share
the same physical space.252 Here, the only difference between the physical and the
virtual face-to-face encounter is the third factor. The third factor is relevant only
towards “topics or issues that are contradicted by the physical setting (e.g., ‘I’m
working on the case report’ when in fact the speaker is surfing news on the web).”253
A witness’s testimony cannot be contradicted by the physical setting of the witness
stand. Consequently, there is no difference in regard to a truth-inducing effect
between a physical face-to-face conversation and a virtual face-to-face conversation.
Moreover, even when the lack of shared space creates an opportunity to lie about
physical setting, the study provides a clear remedy: “videoconferencing.”254 In sum,
there is a nugatory difference in one’s ability to deceive when changing from a
physical, face-to-face interaction to a virtual, face-to-face interaction.
A study by the University of Michigan supports this notion that virtual faceto-face meetings are tantamount to physical face-to-face meetings for the purposes of
a truth-inducing effect. The research team studied 121 truthful and deceptive video
clips from real court trials, including those involving Jodi Arias and Donna Scrivo,
along with testimonies obtained from the Innocence Project website. 255 The study
developed an algorithm that correctly identified lying with a 60–75 percent success
rate, which outperformed humans who “perform slightly above the chance level.” 256
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The following behaviors were more often associated with lying: (1) grimacing of the
whole face, (2) looking directly at the questioner, (3) gesturing with both hands, (4)
speaking with more vocal fill such as “um,” (5) distancing themselves from the action
with words such as “he” or “she” rather than “I” or “we,” and (6) using phrases that
reflected certainty.257 Remember, it is not the defendant who weighs the credibility
of the witness, rather that is the factfinder’s function. If the witness has a virtual
face-to-face meeting with the defendant—while sitting in the witness stand as is
required by the Double-Blind System—then the jury is able to observe all of those
behaviors that indicate when one is lying. Ultimately, the witness, the defendant, and
the jury retain all capacities to weigh behaviors that indicate deception under the
Double-Blind System.
One question remains: Assuming arguendo that the truth-telling effect is
triggered by a physical face-to-face interaction, is it also triggered by a virtual faceto-face interaction? There is no research on point for such a precise question, but we
can analogize from the medical context, which compares physical face-to-face therapy
with virtual face-to-face therapy. According to a systematic review in 2010 that
compared videoconferencing with physical, face-to-face sessions, “[T]here is a strong
hypothesis that videoconference-based treatment produces the same results as faceto-face therapy . . . .”258 A study that compared videoconferencing with face-to-face
mental health sessions for American veterans found identical assessments of soft
variables such as rapport and empathy.259 Another study found virtually equivalent
clinical outcomes and measures for process variables such as satisfaction between
patients who used virtual meetings or physical face-to-face meetings.260 Even Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama (“Blue Cross”)—an insurance company that
consistently resisted covering video telehealth services due to concerns of
effectiveness—began covering virtual face-to-face visits as of December 2015. 261
Ultimately, the mounting research convinced Blue Cross that virtual health visits
were “indistinguishable from a [physical] face-to-face visit.” 262 This realization is
aligned with the industry standard that offers “almost universal” coverage of live
video telehealth services by entities such as Aetna, Anthem, and UnitedHealthcare.263
Consequently, if insurance companies and studies overwhelmingly agree that virtual
257
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face-to-face visits are tantamount to physical face-to-face visits in virtually every
aspect, then it is hard to imagine that any meaningful intangible elements that
concerned the Eighth Circuit are lost in translation.
Finally, one court provided another distinct rationale for why virtual face-toface confrontation is not constitutionally equivalent to its physical counterpart:
“Even the most cutting-edge technology cannot wholly replace the
weight of in-court testimony, for the electronic delivery of that
testimony—no matter how clearly depicted and crisply heard—is
isolated from the solemn atmosphere of the courtroom and compromises
human connection to emotions like fear, apprehension, or confusion.”264
Importantly, the Double-Blind System never substitutes in-court testimony.
Accordingly, this concern is a moot point because the witness, regardless of age or
crime, will always testify in court.
ii.

Defendant’s Right to Assist in Trial is Diminished

A criminal defendant has “a due process right ‘to be present in his own person
whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his
opportunity to defend against the charge.’”265 This right is not absolute and is not
guaranteed “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.”266 Thus,
the defendant is allowed to be present only “to the extent that a fair and just hearing
would be thwarted by his absence.” 267
The benefits of a defendant’s in-court physical presence may protect individual
and institutional interests. At an individual level, the right may ensure the
defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel, to participate in trial strategy, to
assist in presenting a defense, and to aid with cross-examination.268 One rarely cited
concern also includes the ability to “influence the jury psychologically by [the]
defendant’s presence.” 269 At the institutional level, the defendant’s presence may
ensure public confidence in the courts by establishing the appearance of fairness in
the execution of justice.270
In the Double-Blind System, the defendant retains the absolute ability to
communicate with counsel, to participate in trial strategy, and to aid with crossexamination because the defendant will hear and see the evidence, albeit through a
monitor. Moreover, the defendant will have constant communication with defense
counsel through a telephone or an earpiece setup. In a sense, this setup occurs in
264
265
266
267
268
269
270

White v. State, 116 A.3d 520, 544 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987).
Id.
Id.
E.g., State v. Kaulia, 291 P.3d 377, 393 (Haw. 2013).
State v. Reevey, 8 A.3d 831, 842 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
Pinkney v. State, 711 A.2d 205, 209 (Md. 1998).

82

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[6:1

professional leagues such as the National Football League every day, and many
coaches swear by it: many play callers prefer strategizing from an upstairs booth to
being on the sideline because it provides a more complete view. 271 In court, the
defendant may be freed from worrying about showing emotions, or lack thereof, that
may be misinterpreted by a jury. Likewise, a psychological influence on the jury may
not benefit the defendant and certainly has no basis in law: jurors have a “duty to
base [their] verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy” and
reaching a verdict based on psychological influences from a defendant contradicts the
oath that every juror takes.272 Institutionally, the appearance of justice is furthered
because jurors will observe the precautions taken to ensure bias is removed from the
judicial system. Moreover, jurors will be aware the defendant is present, although
virtually.
Courts acknowledge that the right to be present may be accomplished
virtually, in addition to physically.273 One might argue those cases arise when the
defendant forfeits his or her Sixth Amendment rights due to disruptive behavior and,
therefore, are not analogous to this system. Yet, courts are not required to employ
virtual arrangements for those defendants. 274 Hence, it is notable that courts
acknowledge that a defendant’s presence is preserved by employing digital
arrangements such as CCTV. Courts focus on the following arrangements, which are
guaranteed in the Double-Blind System, as indicators that no violation of the Sixth
Amendment or abuse of discretion has occurred: the ability of the defendant to view
and hear proceedings via closed circuit television and the ability to communicate with
counsel.275 Thus, courts have considered situations similar to what the Double-Blind
System proposes and found no material curtailment of the defendant’s right to assist
in his or her own trial.
E.

The Double-Blind System’s Limitations
i.
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This is a feature, rather than a flaw of the system. One prosecutor explained,
“I never had a case where taking the stand worked for the defendant.” 276 This
sentiment is reflected by the fact that defendants rarely choose to take the stand.
Nevertheless, defendants always have a right to testify in criminal trials.277 Jurors
are normally instructed that “they should not hold the decision not to testify against
a defendant,” but some undoubtedly may speculate why a defendant sits in a court
silently as countless accusers come before him or her. 278 Under this system, this
speculation may be significantly reduced because the absence of the defendant will
become normalized. This enhances the tactical choice to bring a defendant on the
stand since, up to that point, the jurors are unable to hold prejudice against the
defendant. Under the Double-Blind System, if the defendant does choose to testify,
he or she would testify just as he or she would today.
a.

Homogenous Juries and Groupthink

Juries, like all groups, are susceptible to a basic principle: “If the observers
share a bias, the aggregation of judgments will not reduce it.” 279 Accordingly, a
homogenous pool may be biased against a defendant due to biases including
overconfidence and groupthink. The Framers, albeit in different words, likely
understood this concept. In 1774, British parliament feared British soldiers accused
of killing American colonists might face biased juries when tried by Americans, so the
Administration of Justice Act (AJA) mandated that all British soldiers were to be
tried exclusively in England.280 The Declaration of Independence criticized this action
as one of the “Intolerable Acts.”281 In response, our Framers wrote the eternal words:
“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”282 The Supreme Court
later elaborated, “[S]election of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” 283
The purpose of this selection is threefold:
(1) [to guard] “against the exercise of arbitrary power” and [ensure] that
the “commonsense judgment of the community” will act as “a hedge
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor, ” (2) [to preserve]
“public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,” and (3)
[to implement] our belief that “sharing in the administration of justice
is a phase of civic responsibility.”284
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To avoid delving too deeply into a separate constitutional discussion involving
the Sixth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and a string of recent decisions—
namely Batson v. Kentucky—this Paper simply argues that the current practice of
jury selection clashes with the purpose and history of American jury selection. The
use of peremptory challenges has led to a perverse system foreshadowed by Justice
Marshall: “Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a
juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons . . . [i]f such
easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor’s obligation
to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court
. . . may be illusory.” 285 Marshall argued that peremptory challenges should be
eliminated because they may be rooted in a prosecutor’s “own conscious or
unconscious racism” that may be mirrored by the judge, who accepts the explanation
due to the judge’s own “conscious or unconscious racism.” 286 Marshall noted, an
“instruction book used by the prosecutor’s office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly
advised prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate ‘any member
of a minority group.’”287 Another treatise for prosecutors read, “Do not take Jews,
Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how
rich or how well educated.”288
The consequences on jury diversity are far-ranging. Dahlia Lithwick laments,
“Study after study reflects the fact that black jurors are struck far more frequently
than white ones.”289 Historical evidence indicates the persistence of this issue. From
1983–1984, the “chance of a qualified black sitting on a jury was 1 in 10, compared to
1 in 2 for a white” juror in Dallas County.290
It may be more appropriate to restate Marshall’s concern of unconscious racism
as the idea of implicit biases today. Yet, this Paper offers an alternative to Marshall’s
proposal to eliminate peremptory challenges. First, we should keep peremptory
challenges. Second, we should mandate a heterogeneous pool at the petit jury stage,
rather than only requiring it at the venire stage. Currently, petit juries actually
chosen are not required to “mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population,” even though they “must be drawn from a source fairly
representative of the community.” 291 The jury petit need not mirror the precise
demographics of the county. Indeed it is impossible to have twelve jurors perfectly
reflect the ethnic diversity of a region. Yet, the jury pool should never contain one
hundred percent of one ethnicity, just as it should never contain exclusively males at
the expense of females. As mentioned earlier, a study by Duke University found
285
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significant disparities in conviction rates by all-white juries were practically
eliminated when just one member of the out group deliberated with the majority.292
If peremptory challenges struck all minorities, then we should simply draw from
another venire pool until minimum diversity is met. In a decision that decided the
merits of reducing the minimum number of jurors from twelve to six, the court
explained, “[T]he number [of jurors] should probably be large enough to promote
group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair
possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.” 293 “The
Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross-section on the venire is a means of
assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an
impartial one (which it does).” 294 If we fail to ensure juror diversity, we may be
outsourcing our trials to pockets of communities, rather than including a crosssection, in contravention of the underlying policies our Founders sought to cement
into our Constitution.
b.

Eyewitness Bias and Scalia’s “False Accuser”

Although the judge and jury may not see the defendant, certain eyewitnesses
must inevitably view and identify the suspect at trial. The Double-Blind System,
however, is not intended to correct for eyewitness biases. As an aside, consider the
following true story in the context of Scalia’s notion of the “false accuser.”
A lost, drunk passerby asking for directions, within moments, morphed into
Toni Gustus’s rapist. 295 She immediately memorialized his features: white, early
twenties, a little black cross on one arm, dark blond hair that was parted in the
middle, long nose, blue and narrow eyes, and a tapered jaw.296 After identifying the
suspect through police lineups and gaining composure through church, she was ready
to testify at trial.297 She saw her assailant for at least an hour in broad daylight, noted
his key features, and conveyed to the jury she was one hundred percent sure the
defendant present at trial raped her.298 There was only one problem: fourteen years
later, the previously untested rape kit definitively exonerated the incarcerated
defendant, who in fact had been falsely accused by Toni Gustus.299
“Toni Gustus made a mistake, but it was not an error based in malice or hatred.
It was an unintentional error of the mind. Her testimony and her confidence that she
had identified the right person were truly powerful” for the jury. 300 Only after
agreeing to speak with the falsely accused defendant years later did she realize her
292
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mistake: by focusing on providing distinctive routine details to the police, she failed
to notice the defendant’s crooked teeth, which could not have been those of her
attacker who had straight teeth. 301 “The one physical feature that could have
distinguished the rapist from [the defendant]—his teeth—was discarded not because
it was hidden from view but because it was too ordinary to mention.” 302 Here,
cognitive biases such as confirmation bias or focusing effects, along with the effect of
mood states on memory and judgment, directly contributed to the defendant’s false
imprisonment.303
Scalia’s reliance on face-to-face confrontations derived, in part, from his belief
that it is “always more difficult to tell a lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind
his back.’” 304 Scalia believed the fact-finder’s ability to observe jurors, who make
determinations based on weighing credibility of a witness, ensured the integrity of
the fact-finding process.305 Scalia acknowledged the emotional costs of such face-toface interactions on victims, but emphasized the procedure may “undo the false
accuser.”306 Yet, Scalia failed to account for the unwitting false accuser vis-à-vis the
“false accuser,” by propounding individuals as fully capable of separating truth from
misperceptions. These situations are eerily insidious because, as Toni Gustus’s case
showed, “[e]veryone was wrong, but no one felt anything was wrong.” 307 By
overlooking unconscious biases and their effect on memory and judgment, Scalia may
have enabled the unwitting false accuser who confidently accuses a guilty mirage
while staring face-to-face with an innocent defendant: a performance that any jury
will be swayed by. As of 2013, conclusive DNA tests exonerated 250 prisoners: nearly
seventy-five percent of those cases were decided on mistaken eyewitness accounts.308
We must rethink age-old reasoning in light of the scientific evidence on bias. Scalia’s
procedure is futile against an unwitting “false accuser,” whose harm on the factfinding process is tantamount to the false accuser who knowingly tells a lie to
incarcerate the innocent.
c.

Characteristics that Are Necessary for Charges or Defenses
May Be Revealed.

In a few situations, the defendant may not remain completely anonymous due
to the charges or defenses raised. Such charges may include hate crimes or other
discriminatory charges, including age or racial discrimination. Cultural
characteristics of the defendant may be relevant for some courts in even rarer cases
when determining the reasonable person standard, the defendant’s mens rea, or
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relevant degrees of homicide.309 Defense counsel may attack the credibility of the
witness by identifying flaws in cross-racial eyewitness identification as well. In these
cases, the defendant will remain invisible, but the parties may stipulate that the
defendant falls into a certain class, or alternatively, is not of the same class as the
victim.
d.

Indirect Indicators of Class May be Revealed

Jurors or judges may form conjectures about a defendant’s characteristics—
whether consciously or subconsciously, correctly or incorrectly—through
circumstantial evidence. Someone’s name can indicate race, sex, religion, and even
birthplace in general. In all likelihood, you will classify names—Tyrone, Brett, Emily,
Precious, Mohamed, Jesus, Jose, Cho—into certain ethnic groups automatically.
Hence, the Double-Blind System suggests substituting the defendant’s name with
initials.
Nevertheless, witnesses, either as groups or individuals, may signal a
defendant’s characteristics. For example, if a white female came to testify as an alibi
witness for her son, a juror may conclude the defendant is also white. Alternatively,
homogenous classes of witnesses may also indicate a defendant’s race. If defense
counsel calls two friends, a girlfriend, and a pastor—all of whom are black—the judge
and jury may conclude the defendant is also black. Likewise, if defense counsel calls
witnesses who only speak Spanish, the jury or judge may conclude the defendant is
Latino.
Qualifications may also suggest a defendant’s background. Someone with a BA
in Physics from Harvard and a PhD in Astrophysics from Columbia may conjure up
an image of certain ethnicities more readily than others.
Sites of crimes may also suggest the ethnicity of a defendant. Areas such as
Chinatown may indicate a defendant is Asian. Cities such as Detroit, Michigan, or
neighborhoods such as Watts, Los Angeles, California, may indicate a black
defendant because they generally contain a greater percentage of black residents.
Likewise, Little Haiti in Miami or Washington Heights in New York may indicate
Haitian or Dominican defendants.
Coded language may also uncover traits. For instance, parlance such as “superpredators” or “thugs” may be commonly interpreted as referring to black males by an
audience.310 A witness may conceivably use other terms or descriptions, for example,
the perpetrator had a “thick accent” to convey the defendant is an immigrant.
Notably, these words on their own have no association to classes such as religion or
race, but society, and thus a jury, might interpret these terms, correctly or
erroneously, to mean the defendant is of a particular group.
309

310

See, e.g., People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 883 (Ct. App. 1991) (“Evidence of defendant’s cultural
background was clearly relevant on the issue of premeditation and deliberation . . . . Second, the
evidence of defendant’s cultural background was also relevant on the issue of malice aforethought and
the existence of heat of passion at the time of the killing.”).
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Poor Transmission of Image or Audio May Disrupt
Proceedings

Technical malfunctions are foreseeable with any technology. In Sewell, the
appellant argued that distortions in a witness’s live testimony via interactive
television precluded effective cross-examination and impaired the jury’s ability to
observe the witness. 311 Appellant’s second point of error is irrelevant here, as the
witness testifies only in court, creating an immediate improvement on current
models. Effective cross-examination is less concerning, again, because the witness
will be testifying in court in the physical presence of both attorneys. The harm occurs
when the defendant is momentarily unable to view proceedings, hear proceedings, or
communicate with defense counsel.
The court in Sewell distinguished between minor distortions—occasional
transitory and insignificant static-type interference with the video image and very
slight time delays between questions and answers—and major technical deficiencies
that could reasonably be viewed as impairing the right to cross-examination.312 The
court also noted that time delays that may allow a witness to answer a question before
a court rules on an objection may occur with live in-court testimony, thus minor
technological delays do not negate one’s right to cross-examination.313
In the Double-Blind System, courts may similarly distinguish between minor
technological deficiencies that do not run afoul of a defendant’s constitutional rights
and major deficiencies that do. Minor deficiencies may include static; occasional
visual distortions, such as dropped signals or pixelated images; or occasional drops in
transmissions including video, audio, or communicative signals. Major deficiencies
might include a broken microphone, uninterrupted loss of audio or visual signals, or
a malfunction of defense counsel’s headset throughout trial. If all else fails, the court
can resort to bringing the defendant back into the courtroom or continuing the trial
to the next day. If we can communicate with a man on the moon, it seems unlikely
that such hiccups would prove to be insurmountable.
f.

Other Biases

Undoubtedly, other biases will remain. Adjudication is just one of the many
phases of the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system encompasses biases
that affect arrests, eyewitness line-ups, discretionary choices in prosecutions, and
several other situations. This Double-Blind System only reaches a fraction, albeit an
important part, of the entire criminal justice sequence.
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Id.
Id.

2018]
IV.

Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom

89

WHY SCIENCE BECAME BLIND

The double-blind procedure is the foundation of science and medicine: it is a
requirement for FDA approval of new drugs, scientists who seek federal grants for
new studies, and publication in academic journals.314 This procedure likely impacts
you or a close family member, considering roughly sixty percent of Americans take
some form of a prescription drug.315
This procedure became intrinsic to our health and scientific research simply
because the procedure is shown to eliminate the same problems that pervade our
courts: biases.316
During the late eighteenth century, Americans used blind assessment to test
treatments associated with bias. 317 In turn, blind assessments bolstered claims of
legitimacy and scientific respectability. 318 Blind assessment—in this case actual
blindfolds on subjects claiming to be mesmerized—definitively proved mesmerism did
not exist.319 It also showed the human mind may irrationally act on information that,
in reality, has no causal meaning. 320 Consequently, blind assessment has been a
proven technique to eliminate bias in medicine, rather than simply mitigate its
effects.321 Historically, patients also held biases towards certain treatments because
of their knowledge of or expectation of the treatment; today we call this the placebo
effect.322
Biases also affect researchers.323 In the nineteenth century, these biases were
shown across all scientific disciplines. 324 An editorialist at the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) in 1909 succinctly explained researcher bias:
The theory of medicine, as of all other sciences, has often been affected
by the personal equation—that constant error to which each individual
is subject to a greater or lesser degree. Each observer, though he may be
able to see facts clearly and even to trace the relation of cause and effect
314
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BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 173 (2016).
Brady Dennis, Nearly 60 Percent of Americans—the Highest Ever—Are Taking Prescription
Drugs, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2015/11/03/more-americans-than-ever-are-taking-prescription-drugs/.
See Ted J. Kaptchuk, Intentional Ignorance: A History of Blind Assessment and Placebo Controls in
Medicine, 72 BULL. HIST. MED. 389, 390–91, 393 (1998).
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
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See id. at 396, 398 (“The perceived effect of mesmerism was the result of illusions created by the human
mind.”) For example, a patient fell into a somnambulistic trance based on the drop of scissors, the
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ROBERTSON & KESSELHEIM, supra note 314, at 46.
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among them to some extent, is liable to error in the interpretation of
these facts in proportion to the degree of his fixed personal bias . . . .325
A member of the American Medical Association added, “In order to obtain
trustworthy data, it is necessary . . . [to] eliminate personal bias . . . .”326
V.

OTHER APPLICATIONS FOR THE DOUBLE-BLIND SYSTEM
A.

Voir Dire

Although not the scope of this Paper, a separate and distinct solution for biases
that arise during voir dire may also entail an offshoot of the Double-Blind System: a
voir dire app. As generations become increasingly fluent with technology, this method
may show extended benefits of blinding attorneys in the courtroom. The app could
work as follows: first, jurors who have a smartphone may download the app and login
using encrypted credentials. Jurors who do not have a smart phone may be provided
a tablet or simple smartphone temporarily by the court. Second, attorneys may
conduct voir dire as usual, with a few modifications.
For example, say the first question is, “Have you been a victim of a crime?” On
the app, a list of crimes will populate and jurors may select an appropriate key, such
as “A” for assault. A list of responses, anonymous to the attorneys but nevertheless
certified under oath and recorded by the clerk, will show on a projector or individual
screens. Attorneys may follow up and ask, “Did you contact the police or did you feel
the police acted professionally?” Jurors may then use a key indicating “yes” or “no.”
These explanations will then broadcast to the projector or screens, and attorneys may
expand the discussion to other jurors by asking, “Does anyone else feel that police
always act professionally in this encounter?” Jurors may then respond “yes” or “no.”
Importantly, this will ensure the privacy of the juror and blind the attorneys
to the physical characteristics of jurors through responses that are not directly traced.
Jurors will receive randomized numbers or letters that each juror maintains
throughout voir dire. Attorneys can take corresponding notes, for example, noting
juror “C” or juror “23” responded, “I wouldn’t trust a police officer if the officer said
the sky was blue.” Accordingly, the attorney could use a peremptory strike or strike
that juror for cause. Of course, if attorneys wish to peremptorily strike a juror because
of behavioral cues, such as lack of eye contact or apparent disinterestedness, the
attorney may do so. Those behavioral reasons, however, will be entirely divorced from
responses to questions. This method may ameliorate the concerns of Justice Marshall
voiced in Batson by blinding attorneys to immutable characteristics that are
irrelevant in the voir dire process.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Double-Blind System is a versatile procedure that may be implemented in
various ways. This Paper recommends two potential methods of immediate
implementation, though it lays the groundwork for wider application in the
courtroom. In either framework, the Double-Blind System should be used at the
outset to blind jurors only, not judges. It also should not be used in capital murder
cases yet, since they involve a balance under the Eighth Amendment that is not
addressed here.
First, defendants may opt in and assert their right to use the Double-Blind
System through a motion. This setup would be accomplished through knowing and
intelligent waiver, and may be performed today.
Second, the Double-Blind System may be proposed through legislation as a brightline rule that is mandatory in most cases. The legislature may designate cases, such
as capital murder, where the system is not appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The Double-Blind System will eliminate many biases that currently percolate
through the criminal courtroom: namely concealed and implicit biases. The system is
radically different, yet radically simple. In more than one way, the Double-Blind
System may act as a seatbelt on our often imperceptible and unavoidable biases.
In the 1950s, the rate of deaths per mile driven was five times higher than it
is today. 327 Scholars offered countless explanations, including faulty cars, poorly
designed roads, and careless drivers.328 Initially, Ford responded by implementing
safer steering wheels and padded instrument panels, before realizing “the best fix
. . . was also the simplest one”: a seatbelt.329 A Ford employee calculated the benefits
of countless saved lives at relatively no cost and relatively no penalty for drivers who
wore them. 330 Although consumers initially were offended by seatbelts as they
considered it a criticism of their driving, nudges gradually resulted in 80 percent
compliance for wearing seatbelts and reduction in the risk of death by roughly 70
percent for car passengers.331
Similarly, the Double-Blind System confronts a broken criminal justice system.
The product is a prison system in America that ranks as the world’s largest with
roughly 2.2 million prisoners. 332 Although African Americans constitute just 13
percent of the nation’s population, they represent 42 percent of those 2.2 million
327
328
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prisoners and 42 percent of the death row population. 333 Although disparate
treatment abounds in the criminal justice system, countless scholars offer more and
more complex and costly solutions. Yet, again, the best fix may also be the simplest.
The Double-Blind System will not eliminate all biases in the criminal justice system,
nor will it eliminate all biases within the courtroom. But it will significantly reduce
them, if given the chance. Similarly, judges or jurors may take offense and consider
the system a criticism on their fairness, but small nudges may indeed significantly
reduce the habits of acting on implicit bias. This approach is not focused at reducing
specifically racial or gender bias, but rather it focuses on all biases: current and
future, concealed and implicit, acceptable and inappropriate. It is a blunt instrument
that seeks to eradicate all biases, in contrast to other complicated solutions that
myopically focus on trendy issues such as race.
Today, more than four out of ten Democrats and Republicans believe the other
party’s policies pose a threat to the nation. 334 Nearly ninety percent of African
Americans believe they are lacking in equal rights, whereas only roughly half of
whites agreed.335 Fear of the other led to the relocation of all Japanese Americans in
1941, anger led to a 1,700% increase of hate crimes against Muslim Americans
immediately after 9/11,336 and today, distrust is reaching unprecedented levels.337
Today, we need a seatbelt more than ever in the one place that serves as a refuge for
impartiality, fairness, and integrity: the criminal courtroom. That seatbelt is the
Double-Blind System.
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